Chapter 1: Ontology

In which we argue against the paradigm of parts and quantities

A) Thesis

1. Individuation is an illusory consequence of four-dimensional perception; an actual continuum of probable entitation exists prior to the present moment. Where there is no perceiving subject, there exists only the probable and the result of collapsing the probable into the relative actual: a mechanical causal sequence which occurs after the probable has become actual. The perceived world is the after-effect of a cloud of probability, existing prior to what we call the present moment. The past and future shake hands with the probable, both hands reaching across an approximated now from either side, to determine the real. In order to understand a thing, we must understand it in time, such that a thing is defined by its extension in space relative to its extension in time. Because of the nature of probability waves as ontologically real things, we regard this cloud of probability as, not only a real thing, but as the only real thing.

While ontology can and should be more than physics, it must be aligned with physics, and certainly should not contradict it. This chapter’s ambition is to show that, by current understanding, any existing thing must exist in a static, present moment, which is an impossibly small sliver of time that cannot possibly exist. The observing subject raises additional ontological questions: subjects are necessarily a step behind in the causal sequence, asynchronous with the present moment due to the physical latency of sensory data through the nervous network. We are detached eternally from the ‘now’ – we live only a ghost of the moment, and in this way, observing subjects are unable to perceive existing things. Instead, we experience a murky synthesis of sensory data about a thing which has already changed, a thing that has already slipped into the probability of the past. Reality’s observation of itself functions on the same dilemma, and this point exposes a philosophic surprise: being depends on an erroneous metaphysics of time, whereas a relativistic and probabilistic ontology of doing gives us room to maneuver within the constraints of language and logic without rejecting the absurdities of science.

This leads me to conclude that things never become existing entities, never achieve being, but exist in a state of probability prior to and past an impossible individuation of time we call the present moment. Most problematically, in situations where no observers are present, there is no possibility of individuation or entities, but rather, a soup of probable parts which are entities only enough to cause sequence. The act of identifying a quantity, of placing a quantity into an identity correspondence, of individuation by the application of identity and all corresponding sameness, reveals a simple truth forming the second cornerstone of my metaphysics: only subjects identify individual quantities. With no subject present to call something a thing, quantities and individual things exist as themselves only in relation to other things, and only as the dynamic system of reactions and forces comprising the quantum world and relativistic macroscopia, which are neither static nor made up of static parts. I call these things entitations, ontologically real insofar as they are ontologically relative to each other. This contrasts with individuation, for while perception asserts the idea that there must be entities of some kind, it finds a way to accommodate the idea that things have no ‘is-ness’ beyond what they do. Where there is no perceiving subject, the only individual quantities that could possibly exist are the questionably individual fundamental particles identified statistically by sub-atomic physics. And if we seek the marrow of a philosophy of individual things, we must cut to the fundamental, physical building-blocks of reality, or we can never gain the objective view we need to understand how we invent logic, and why we approach physics the way that we do.

Let us pit this ontology against everyday perception and gain a clear idea of the Heraclitan cosmos. I turn to a reliable and consistent example: a single stone. Hold this little thing in your hand; toss it gently into the air – catch it again… it feels like such a simple, solitary thing as it tumbles back into the fingers. How can anyone wonder if this stone is a thing? Why should it be suspect, when perception tells us so clearly, this is a thing, and this thing is real? But this stone is not a stone when no perceiving subject identifies it, indeed it is nothing but a local perception, a fluid, moving and temporary mineral snapshot of the cosmos, perceived relative to time and at the scale of its location. It is an occasional, localized gathering of a thing that once changed into this stone, even as the molecular bits that flake off from it show it is already changing into something else – before we can perceive it – fluctuating alongside an ever-fluctuating universe. More than ‘a stone’, we must imagine that which makes-up the stone in compendium – we must go inside the stone, zoom-in to witness the ineluctable flux and internal movement, the chemistry dance – the doings – that result in the aggregation of those parts into this thing that appears reasonable, static, and unified to four-dimensional subjects. Then we must delve deeper than chemistry, to see the smallest constituent parts of the stone and reconcile science with reason, science which tells us that the stone’s constituent parts are, not parts, but unindividuated fluctuations of force. This is the opposite of our natural proclivity, for we are desperate to get to the bottom of things by a trusty cascade of ever-smaller physics, down to the rock-solid bottom floor of cold reality – down to a ‘one-thing’: we need to believe that particle physics makes ontological sense to qualified scientists, because we need atomic science to make ontological sense, so that molecular science makes sense, so that chemical science makes sense, in order that reason can feel comfortable with the ontology imposed on it by scaled perception of ‘things’. Let us not be too concerned with understanding the nature or essence of this fundamental force, nor too distracted to call it God or the Will to Power, but rather, let us concentrate on the idea that reality cannot be as material, as individuated, as we perceive. The result will not deny us a useful and reasonable ontology.

In a stone, it is the activities of the microcosmos of sub-atomic bits that, beyond the noun ‘stone’ and the verb ‘are’, are the parts that make up the thing we call a stone, not the phenomenological qualities of the stone, nor the objectivity perceivers observe. A stone changes slowly, but never stops changing – never doesn’t change, and, like every other thing we can identify ontologically, will never become what it is, for it will already have changed before one can utter even a single noun to describe it. The bits have shifted, changed, reshaped, re-thinged, or are in some way different enough from one ‘moment’ to the next, that the stone can never pause on a snapshot identity correspondence; this thing we call a stone, that we toss into the air and catch with our hand, can never be.

Glass is perhaps an even better example, a mineral material that appears as an unchanging solid, but is essentially a slowly flowing liquid.(28) Or perhaps an example from biological life would be more immediate: the top branches of a willow are unaware that they are part of the same entity that we perceive at the bottom of the ‘same’ drooping tree, though a breeze may brush the branches against its exposed roots. A casual thinker perceives through the principle of individuation with the kind of rigor needed to make sense of what is seen and sensed, and all of what appears to be so very individual from our high mountain perch. To unriddle an old koan about the sound of a tree falling in the forest when there is no present perceiving subject: what tree?

Without the presence of a perceiving subject, what stands in the forest is a continuum of what we think are parts and what we know are nature’s forces, easily summarized in a noun: ‘tree’. Perspective sets the parameters of what we know to be reality – for example, an insect may pass a lifetime exploring a single sycamore, convinced that the one great tree in which they live is the only one, that this is the entire world, not aware that they are deep in a thick grove thick of sycamores, swarming with other insects who think the same thing. Or is it more likely that an insect never perceives the individual sycamore as anything more than an entitation, which bleeds seamlessly into a blurry, continuous grove, never perceiving the unity of a single sycamore or any of the other ‘different trees’? Does the insect perceive even their own unity and identity? But this is neither adequate nor precise, and we must dissolve the tree-perceiving static Self of the insect further. Consciousness, or what I call Self in this work, is a perceived perceiving entity, no more than a collection of perceived parts, and it justifies its error that there are individual things by the belief that it itself is individual: from the perception of things to the thing doing the perceiving, this delusion sets the rules. This summarizes, in a brief pass, the context of my principium entitationis, a principle of entitation, which I offer as an adequate alternative to the shortcomings of the principle of individuation.

Let me simplify the point – this chapter proposes an ontology based on the idea that human perception is limited to invented systems of logic that only approximate the actual, fueled by reasoning that assumes perception is a loyal copy of the same actual. It takes such a philosophy to remind us that perception is always an act of interpretation, that individuation depends on epistemological precision. But precision can only ever be ‘good enough for jazz’, for everyday human use, even as we adopt ontological belief in thingness (or partness) from logical abstraction – in fact directly from the principle of individuation. The belief reciprocates back into how we approach all philosophy: physics, logic, and ethics. It also bleeds into existential questions, influencing how we think about aesthetics, politics, society, economy, culture, and existence itself. When we combine this epistemology with an honest ontology which promises to take particle physics and relativity seriously, we are left with an understanding of things which have no true center. In this way, Yeats was keen to write, “things fall apart, the centre cannot hold”, for as much as the cosmos, as creator and ordinator, binds things to the precise point of a stable center, the universe destroys identity with the relative movement of time. The “mere anarchy” Yeats imagines free in the world could only be consequent to a world full of things with centers, a condition strictly prohibited by the eternally persistent flux of the universe. In the actual reality described to us by our latest, greatest physics, the concept of a ‘center’ is axiomatically erroneous; Yeats was wise to contain his philosophy with poetry.(29)

Logic derives the power of its influence from the idea that nature can be understood in an individuated state, that there are individual things in whatever is actual. But as we saw in the physics section, the founding concepts of individuation are unsatisfactory, and at the extent of what science can explain, all of the questions and problems we encounter in philosophy are indeed problems of individuation. For example, quarks and quasars, both of which are things in the actual world challenging the principle of individuation, are things which share this physical reality, this same place, with us whether or not logic approves. And logic as we know it does not approve of quarks or quasars – the ‘laws of physics’ stop making sense at these thresholds, limits where scientific knowledge itself is the hand that toggles realism to irrealism. But these impossibilities live in the same universe from which we derive our axioms, the same universe where we also live our bleeding, pulsing lives. The fact that science cannot match observation to logic should make us question knowledge as much as we scrutinize the repeatability of observation and how zealously we extrapolate logic from native reason, an almost emotional state.

Pi, a ubiquitously exploited value, is an excellent example of this. We should fret the contradiction that we cannot calculate pi, but that every step of this sisyphean logical exercise is stable, and every calculated digit is correct. With pi, we proceed with poise and confidence along the rigid logic of math in an exercise which only stresses the paradoxes of logic and math. This should indicate to us that the groundwork of logic is flawed in its correspondence to the actual, but we trade the paradox for productivity – we turn away from the problem in order to get things done. The present work is not concerned to get anything done, but precisely to un-do, to wonder at the adequacy of our attempt to comprehend the real, to blaze the unknown summit trail from which we view solid foundations below. By focusing on our erroneous translation of perspective into claims about the world out there, it is this author’s hope to at least wound the beast threatening realists and irrealists alike. Realists will approve of how my approach makes deep reality claims possible by dissolving the subjectivity of the perceiver into an objective world of manifest relativity and probability, while irrealists will appreciate that my argument undermines the realist method of correlating subjectivity to the flawed ontology of individuation. In the end, we find a novel real that is a bit of both, in the fresh air of new hills.

Science does not hold us back when we interrogate individuation. It encourages us to see that the most fundamental particles can interfere with themselves by existing simultaneously as both individual things and as non-individuated things (as particles and as waves). We learn this from the particle physics branch of science, which wants to comprehend reality as discrete packages (‘quanta’), but finds quantities are actually ontologically real waves of probability. We ignore the discrepancy and dismiss the question of how a thing can be a particle and a wave at the same time without suspecting we have erred in assuming that quantifaction is a philosophically valid approach in the first place. Do we insist on calling it ‘quantum physics’ because it sounds so hip, or because despite the science we still believe in quantities, or both?

Humans are the confused species, the only earthling deceived by perception to invent knowledge and logic out of the error of individuation. We say comfortably that space can be quantified, but we concede that the notion of quantified time is our construct; in a vulgar mysticism we implore that moments exist only in the human mind, that time is divisible continuum. And we assume that it is because time does not refer to objects like space that moments are the mind’s concoction, while the impossibility of individuating anything accounts for our inability to quantify space or time. We use tautological linguistics to invent the objects that we try to quantify, which is why our conceptual models do not correlate to the actual, and why the paradoxes of mathematics are as numerous as maple seeds scattered by the wind. It could not have been otherwise that modern science would produce the incompatible Quantum and Relativity Theories, which represent two fundamentally antithetical ontologies: one of quantities as continua, and one of continua as quantities. Reason begets wonder begets reason – order needs chaos to form order – something needs nothing to be something. This is why there is something instead of nothing, why there is nothing instead of something – behold, the creator of our cosmos which was never born and will never die!
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2. It is our nature as things that identify themselves as individual that we would seek to assemble reality in a reflexive schema because of our sense of Self and our belief that Self is individual. But, as evidenced by the mysticism industry, we are simultaneously aware of the oneness and flowing contiguity of all things, so we arrived, eventually and necessarily, first at Galileo’s Relativity theory and later at Einstein’s. And while we seem ready to try to comprehend what quantum physics tells us about deep reality, complete with real, ontologically manifest waves of probability behaving in ways impossible to logic, few are prepared to commit to the ontology of Relativity, where neither space, nor time, nor motion can exist. We want to, but cannot, commit epistemologically to the former, while we don’t want to, but can, commit ontologically to the latter.

Yet while no one has ever observed a truly fundamental particle, anyone can point a very real telescope at an actual example of gravitational lensing to witness the ontological reality of Relativity with their own meaty, earth-made eyes.(Footnote 1) As an even more troubling impasse, each theory is convincing on its own, but they contradict each other such that one, or both, are certainly incomplete – one or both theories assumes a fundamental error about the nature of things, or reality itself is woven from the skein of logical contradiction. This book credits the wild success of science and assumes that both theories are correct, and their irreconcilability reveals a legitimate physics of absurdity, against the logic at its absurd core. We convince ourselves that both are valid by regarding them separately, and from our irrealism, we are comfortable with the idea that both theories are only tools for doing science; this is a tragedy against the spirit of science! No one minds that we compromise our ability to speak substantially about reality from this posture as long as we can continue to manufacture and use the tools, the useful beliefs; we grind on like soldier ants who have no greater purpose, and betray the glorious potential of humanity! In this way, our era might be remembered in history as a time when we were confident in our lack of certainty in our confident knowledge; we are convinced we have missed some secret whispered in the data of our disturbing new sciences, a theoretical cohesion that would dissolve absurdity and restore reason: a ‘theory of everything’; yet we chose easily to embarrass ourselves by our own convictions. We would never let the fact that the two theories do not correlate get in our way of suspending belief in either – rather, we let non-belief in reality get in the way of real-world ontological evidence, leaping bravely over the contradiction with upturned palms and shrugged shoulders: this is the modern fashion. This entire complication stems from the fact that the deepest and most unquestioned tenets of our default ontology is missing the dimension of time: we impose the uncanny static over a dynamic reality and are confused that our photograph does not portray the magic of a motion picture or the richness of a real-life moving scene.

The claim, that something can be at once a particle and a wave is predicated on the concepts of simultaneity and sameness of moments. But when we evoke moments, we face the impossibility of individuating anything, including time. Is it any wonder that neither quantum physics nor Relativity speak definitively on the metaphysics of the present moment? Neither account for the perception delay in perceivers due to the neural network, the fact that it takes a certain amount of time – a certain duration – for sensation to travel through the nerves to the brain, such that we only experience that which is in the past.(30) And how exactly do we grasp the present moment if not by a comparison of change? We know the moment is somewhere in the flow of time, and our method of measuring time’s forward roll is to analyze the morphology of things at certain moments, to calculate a comparison of the changes in a thing in such a way that our idea of the nature of time centers on change in contrast to sameness: changes that came about in a thing because of changes that occurred to some more fundamental parts which make-up that thing. But when we zoom-in to find the fundamental parts of space or time that changed, we find only more fundamental parts, or parts which cannot any longer be described in terms of ‘partness’, in which changes cause all subsequent larger changes – parts made-up of parts that are made-up of parts, in a flux of perceived duration. We want to find the ‘part’, but we ignore the verbal ‘made-up’; we want the thing, but don’t notice that the making-up of it is the thing. In the end we observe only entities existing by virtue of change alone.

We zoom-out to face the physics of colliding galaxies where physical paradoxes arise again, but in familiar, life-sized dimensions. While the scale of a galaxy is inconceivably larger than what we consider life-sized, the black hole at the center is collapsed to a physical dimension that our science and our geometry is incapable of expressing, and we are again reduced to logical paradox in a macroscopic example. Logic as individuated meaning, codified, translated, and externalized, fails at these hues of the perception spectrum, just when we need it to be consistent and universal. The discrepancy awaits us in both the microscopic and macroscopic view of the very universe in which we live our days. Though the universe is clearly set-up to allow for this, the discrepancy makes it impossible for humans to fully understand the nature of time and reality, and forces us to resort to irrealism and belief to maintain our sanity. As long as we can only understand time as something made-up of individuated, quantifacted moments, we can only ever grasp at the water, clawing Heraclitus’ river.

In this first chapter, as I deflate the idea of individuation and elevate my principle of entitation, I argue that the idea of Being is erroneous, an impossibility arising from the way we assume a paradigm of one-dimensional time when we perceive causality. Becoming is also only adequate, as the conceptual model of being is required to imagine the idea of becoming. This error is tradition for us: Nietzsche errs when he postulates that becoming can exist without being, by framing ontology in an impossible teleology and calling it ‘eternal return’; in the end his Ouroboros is a complete and static thing-in-itself, a being stuck in time that can never return.(31) Realigning Descartes to this thought, we could say, “I think therefore I think”, with no further ontological commitment, no proposition of ‘is-ness’.(Footnote 2) Doing is more accurate for our haecceitic needs here, and brings us closer to the threshold of adequacy and knowledge.
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3. Four-dimensional entities need one-dimension of time to make logical sense of the causal sequence, for the sequence assumes that time can be individuated; we compromise our understanding of time to ensure the integrity of logic. But if we can only measure moments by changes occurring at an impossibly smaller or bigger scale, then the conclusion is simple: we are not equipped with the means to measure time in precise parts or moments, or measurement, by its nature, can never be precise. No understanding of reality based on measured quantifaction can ever describe reality precisely – or more precisely, can never describe reality. Not equipped to measure parts or moments, we can only approximate to the comfort of adequate knowledge.(Footnote 3) What absolute could coexist comfortably with our principle of adequate knowledge, a principle dependent on the binary of perceived individuation and impossible sameness? My ontology and epistemology reveal that even in the constraints of perception, each binary is at least a trinary, and that we should be skeptical of the possibility of a binary of any kind. For just as the Parmenidesian oneness of the actual universe may be the only one-thing that exists, any flipped coin could defy probability and land on its edge; no binary can be sliced so thin as to reduce the infinitely small dividing line to zero. From this perspective, there is no line dividing a binary that cannot be perceived as infinitely large when we zoom-in far enough.

Not only the human mind, but nature itself is engineered to disallow precise knowledge of itself, which is something about nature we know precisely, giving us license to knowledge that accommodates paradox and contradiction. Here, ‘truth’ is not impossible, not universally relative, but malleable like the relative cosmos, a part of the actual, part of that which contains both truth and the universe; truth in this regard is relative to perspective, nested into an absolute, ever-changing, never-static actual. While irrealism in science is a wise prudence, the selfsame posture shows us that the very phenomena about which we must be irrealist is indeed the foundation of reality. Epistemology is blind to this by maintaining a reality that matches the model envisaged by realists. That is to say, even irrealism assumes that if reality does not correspond to the claims of realists, we must subscribe to irrealism. But how does this epistemological mode bring us closer to understanding objective reality if our sciences show us that reality in fact does not correspond to the ontological assumptions of realists? Realists assume that reality is logical, Newtonian, Apolline, and irrealists base their objection on the same assumption: irrealists are realists about the orderliness and regularity of things, but ground their irrealism on the idea that this is incorrect. As such, our epistemological bottom-line should be at once realist and irrealist about the precision and adequacy of human knowledge, if we argue from within the logic paradigm shared by realists and irrealists alike.

If science requires measured quantities and is primarily the exercise of comparing measured quantities, and if we arrive at an ontology which has us deny individual quantities of any kind, and if our science has led us to these ontological insights about individual quantities, we have exposed a new species of skepticism informed by our science. We can either keep the science, but work to reconcile the irrational conclusions, or we must seek a radical metaphysics which denies modern science; this work aims to preserve science and incorporate absurd conclusions into a fresh epistemological model. Physics has already rebelled, but logic and metaethics resist – modern philosophy cannot synthesize such disparate ideas without isolating them from each other, or assuming a drastic metaphysical or epistemological stance.(Footnote 4) The bottomless sophistry of our age is perpetuated by an academy content to spin its tires in the mud of this paradox; philosophy has discovered a way to argue with itself forever without ever making progress, without covering ground. At any rate I, it is not focused on synthesizing the professional progress of science and philosophy. And we are hopelessly far from satisfaction: for example, most epistemologers, skeptics or otherwise, assume that the actual itself is not approximate. I will demonstrate that it is.

The unified complex of subjectivity (the conscious, individual Self) is an additional complication to my ontology, and this work handles it separately in the logic and metaethics sections by proposing a corollary between my epistemological and ontological theses. Subjectivity requires an individual subject, which insinuates a stone-solid principle of individuation, even while the principle of individuation can only be valid in a reality made-up of immanent individual parts and moments. Because parts and moments exist in perception only, the subject cannot be an actual, manifest thing – our sense of Self can only be relative to our human experience, and as such, can only be illusion. Additionally, proper means and instruments to measure parts and moments are not possible because parts and moments themselves cannot exist as entities. Science hides from the metaphysician in a smokescreen, dismissing all claims about reality with naive, irrealist laughter.

We are trapped forever in this abject cycle! On this point, history reveals a comedic cycle: we began at a place prior to systems of quantifaction, invented systems of mathematics and logic to enhance our precision of measuring and understanding things around us, became uncertain of how to reason the many contradictions, paradoxes, complicated limitations, and side-effects of the paradigm of quantifaction, and continued forward from that point in assuming that things in their natural state are, in fact, quantities: we invented things and logic, pretend that we did not invent things and logic, and now marvel that things behave illogically, irrationally, fantastically, as though things and logic were simply made up. Heraclitus and Nietzsche were both correct on this point, but they did not have quantum physics to verify that which they intuited naturally. The modern academy exploits this by keeping science and ontology far from each other’s influence, a blasphemy and betrayal of the principle goals of both. To the comfort of reason, science posited a theory of quantities at the end of the 19th C to resolve problems in wave and aether theory, and the most interesting part of the new parts-paradigm was that parts behave as waves – not as individual things, but as continua, and we are unable to explain precisely why or how given the language to which we have limited ourselves.(Footnote 5) In the quantifacted, Cartesian spatial matrix, part-waves exist as pure probability, traveling through time, and existing at many places at once. We can call them quantities, but they do not behave consistently as quantities, even bending the rules of physics drastically to avoid such a categorization. The consequence of the following work is a fresh view into the nature of existence for what we call objects and subjects, which would reconcile the error of what we seem to know with what we seem to see from our high mountain perch. I want to climb to a perspective which aligns more closely with what we know existentially, but we will need to climb higher than modern epistemologers are comfortable climbing! Our ascent forces us to lift ourselves hand-over-hand, scaling cliffs with no ropes. This leads us, at the conclusion of this book, to a reasonable alternative to nihilistic pessimism by virtue of the same original reasoning which generated that irrealism and that nihilism. I will demonstrate that we approximate our understanding of things, because things themselves are active approximations, just as the universe is an active, ontological approximation of itself, and just as we are an aspect of the ever-changing universe. These approximations include our understanding of number and of point, our ability to communicate meaning with language, our integration of sound into note, our understanding of existential freedom, and our capacity for compassion and malice among other things, all of which are delimited in their truth-value by the principle of adequacy. At the beginning of the following deduction, I assume, for the sake of argument, that the basic logical and Newtonian concepts I must evoke are valid and legitimate in their common use, in keeping with the reason of perception. Over the course of the deduction that follows, I will show that reasoned ideas like parts, partness, moments, and individuation in general, including of Self, are erroneous. The result can only be the epiphany of a metaphysics of wonder, the wellspring of intuition beyond reason, beyond the orderly expectations of our attempt to individuate a continuous reality. My sense is that if we put aside the sociologic digressions of the past 100 years, the default ontology of humanity, probably since its inception with the Socratic and Aristotelian traditions, has informed metaethics to catastrophic effect. This work proposes an alternate approach.



1. Ontology
B) Definitions and Givens

Definitions
a) Individuation: partitioning of entities.
b) Part: an individuated entity.
c) Partness: the quality of a part that makes it a quantity.
d) Non-partness: the quality of a part that cannot be quantified; written thus because the part in question is something we discuss as though it were a quantified part, even as it exhibits behavior that we do not expect from parts.(Footnote 6)
e) Probability: an actual non-entity, that becomes an actual entity by manifesting causal sequence.
f) Entitation: to seem to come to be an entity.(Footnote 7)
g) Moment: An impossible individuation of time.

Given
a) Standard model worldview of space, time, forces, and our given definitions.
b) Transactional Interpretation of Quantum Theory, given a.
c) Things behave either as sub-atomic particles (‘parts’) or collections of parts, given b.
d) Parts exhibit non-sequential causality, given c.
e) Time appears to flow in a linear direction, and is as such one-dimensional for perceiving subjects, but is not thus bound for entities of a certain size, given d.


1. Ontology
C) Deduction (Footnote 8)

1.1 Collections of parts have no hidden ‘partness’.

1.2 Parts exhibit directly observable partness and, because of the non-sequential causality we encounter in Quantum Theory, indirectly observed ‘non-partness’.

1.3 Partness is traditionally called Being, which is ontology’s traditional concern.

1.4 Being tries to identify a part ontologically in four dimensions, describing the ontology of three dimensional partness in one impossibly specific moment in time.

1.5 Doing describes the ontology of an ever-changing part over time, which, in four dimensions, is understood and indirectly observed as ontologically probable non-partness; ‘becoming’ is not sufficient in that it depends on a model of the idea of ‘being’.

1.6 If partness describes the individuation of an existing part, non-partness describes an existing part as something not individuated.

1.7 Non-partness implies non-linear time in more than one dimension, as a probability cloud, swarming around a nexus of entitation.

1.8 Probable non-partness is not bound to Being’s singular time dimension, so we call non-partness Doing, the consequence of a necessarily continuous probability state of constant flux.

1.9 In the four-dimensional non-partness context, Doing is the consequence of a state of ontological probability which exists prior to the present moment, and surrounds the impossibly small part of time we call the Moment.

1.10 Doing does not require a thing in order to do, because the doing is the thing, even when the language of our logic or the meaning of our language require us to call that which does, a thing.

1.11 Doing describes non-partness better than Becoming: the later assumes the part moving forward into time, while the former implies a continuum of probability collapsing onto perceived partness from a surrounding non-dimensional future probability state.

1.12 Time’s indivisibility as a continuum disallows static partness persistence; the past and future are a part’s non-partness in more than one state of time, and flow toward and away from the idea of the moment by means of the probabilistically necessary mechanics of causal sequence.

1.13 In this way, non-partness, or the probability of a part at a certain place and a certain time, surrounds the fulgurant moment to a paradoxically small point, which we want to call that which has four dimensional partness.

1.14 Non-partness surrounding a singular point of central, paradoxical partness, appears to observers as Being on a linear timeline, with the expected causal sequence.

1.15 Being requires moments of individuated time in and at which to entitate whereas non-partness only requires individuated time to negotiate the mechanics of sequence and cause.

1.16 Entitation is negotiated by the probability of whether something will become an entity at a certain time and place, and the probability of whether it entitated at a certain time and place, perceived in a sequence we understand as causality.

2.1 Parts behave relative to the observer’s spacetime context: observers observe partness; non-partness is exhibited when there is no direct observer.

2.2 In the partness context, partness is exhibited necessarily at the observation moment, never in the past or the future.

2.3 The observation moment is past at the moment it is individuated as a moment, but the idea of a moment feels to observers like logical necessity.

2.4 The observation moment is past when stimuli reach an observer’s brain, so we can never synchronize with what we assume must be a part’s moments of partness.

2.5 Partness remains forever before us, so we can only observe a part’s non-partness, or the illusion of a part’s ‘partness’; perception falls forward into entitation, wanting to observe entities as parts.

2.6 As non-partness, probability seems to observers as probability collapsing into partness, which passes seamlessly through an essentially non-existent present moment into a non-probably existent past; probability leans-backwards toward a present moment to meet a perceiver’s forward-falling.

2.7 Observers perceive non-partness as present moment partness; to observers, non-partness can only be a quality of a past part.

2.8 Since parts can only have partness in a present moment, we only observe a part’s non-partness in the observation moment, which is a past moment when we perceive it.

3.1 ∴ Collections of parts are only ambiguously individuated by other collections of parts called ‘subjects’, which are collections of parts that, by virtue of the mechanics of causality, sequence, and belief, perceive and receive perception as the perspective of a conscious Self.

3.2 ∴ The subject is the only individuator; nothing ever individuates collections of parts when no subject is present, and consequently, parts are perspective-dependent.

3.3 ∴ Reality without subjects consists of an existing swarm of force and probability surrounding the place where the probable immediately becomes a causal sequence that can only be perceived in the past by a perceiving subject, after the objective fact.

3.4 ∴ Individuation is an incoherence; in relation to space (parts) and time (moments), I call this incoherence the ‘parts-ontology’. Doing, and not becoming or non-partness, better approximates the idea of a part’s partness in time’s continuum.

3.5 ∴ Being is four-dimensionally subjective, and ontologically incompatible with non-partness; not accounting for non-partness results in ontological incoherence, even while it allows us to invent logic and language. Thousands of years of inconclusive philosophy are testament to this fact.

3.6 ∴ Reality appears, from the human perspective, as a backward-leaning forward-falling of things onto the moment of time, a falling-onto-place; outside of the singular state of time, probability comprises the ontological thing, as a possibility of is-ness, surrounding the singular point in space and time where the observable moment occurs fulgurantly to four-dimensional observers.

3.7 ∴ The irrationality of irrational numbers is not irrational, while the rationality of rational numbers is not rational.



1. Ontology
D) Axioms

4.1 David Bohm is wise to say, “the world... is not analyzable into parts”.(32)

4.2 Euclid was wise to define the partness of geometric point as “that which has no part”.(33)

4.3 Lao Tzu was wise to note that while thirty spokes converge on a single hub, the cart’s use hinges on each wheel’s central hole.(34)

4.4 Schopenhauer was wise to write, “the particular things… are always becoming and never are.”(35)

4.5 Aristotle was unwise to write, “a point is like the now in time”, and “number is born from a continuous quantum”.(36)

4.6 Heisenberg was wise to write, “...the smallest units of matter are, in fact, not physical objects...”(37)

4.7 Schrödinger was clever to both dodge and insinuate Heraclitan complexity by writing, “Science is reticent too when it is a question of the great Unity – the One of Parmenides – of which we all somehow form a part, to which we all belong.”(38)

4.8 Eddington was wise to write, “Even the physicist is unconcerned as to whether or not atoms or electrons really exist”.(39)

4.9 Heraclitus was wise to note, “We both step and do not step in the same rivers. We are and are not.”(40)

4.10 The Taoists were wise to write, “Tao gave birth to One, One gave birth to Two, Two gave birth to Three, Three gave birth to all of the myriad things”.(41)

4.11 Nietzsche was wise to write, “If I think away all the relationships, all the ‘qualities’, all the ‘activities’ of a thing, then the thing does not remain behind: thingness was only a fiction added by us out of the needs of logic.”(42)





Footnotes


1. Gravitational lensing is a phenomena whereby light from a distant source bends around a large object with significant gravity between the source and the observer, creating a surprising visual effect. ‘Einstein’s Cross’ is an example of gravitational lensing. It is a visible example of the principles of relativity, a place where the theoretical intersects the perceptual.(back)

2. In the final section of this work we isolate the “I” in Descartes’ statement, and find that even it is but a process of doing, never of being or becoming.(back)

3. Cf. Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem.(back)

4. E.g. ‘realism’.(back)

5. Note the many and conflicting interpretations of Quantum Theory.(back)

6. Electrons are a real-world example of non-parts, exhibiting a quality I call non-partness.(back)

7. Cf. 1C.1.16.(back)

8. See Appendix A: Paraphrases.(back)





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